Differences between examiner and applicant citations in the European Patent Office: a first approach by Azagra Caro, Joaquín & Tur, Elena M.
1 
2014 STI conference – 3-5 September 2014 – Leiden, The Netherlands 
Differences between examiner and applicant citations in the European 
Patent Office: a first approach 
Joaquín M. Azagra-Caro and Elena M. Tur
*
 
*
 jazagra@ingenio.upv.es, elmatu@ingenio.upv.es 
INGENIO (CSIC-UPV), Ciudad Politécnica de la Innovación Edif. 8E 4º, Camino de Vera s/n, 46022 Valencia 
 
Abstract–In the US Patent Office, examiners add extra shares of citations to foreign applicants. We explore a 
similar country club effect in the European Patent Office (EPO). Using EPO data of over 3,500,000 citations in 
years 1997-2007, we find national variation in the probability of an applicant originating a citation rather than 
the examiner. Symmetrically to the US case, EPO examiners add extra citations to non-signatory member states. 
Moreover, if examiners are likely to come from the same country of the applicants, applicant-citation shares 
increase, pointing to the existence of national bias in EPO patent examiners. These results hold after controlling 
for sub-national characteristics of the patenting process. 
Keywords–Citations, knowledge flows, national biases 
Introduction 
The geography of innovation makes extensive use of backward citations in patents to measure 
knowledge flows (Jaffe et al., 1993). Several works emphasize the importance of 
distinguishing the origins of citations because, in theory, citations inserted by patent 
examiners are likely to be less localized than applicant citations. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) data mostly tend to confirm this for the US case (Thompson, 
2006) although there are some differences for some specific measures of distance (Alcácer & 
Gittelman, 2006). European data confirm it for some European countries (Criscuolo & 
Verspagen, 2008), but not some regions with low absorptive capacity (Azagra-Caro et al., 
2009). These studies focus on the match or distance between citing and cited country. 
However there is another geographic concern that has been largely unexplored, i.e. what are 
the characteristics of the citing country? Do patent examiners add more citations to patent 
applications from specific countries? 
This is a relevant question because the answer might reveal underlying economic forces that 
are subject to policy influence, or uncover individual questionable examiner practices. There 
is some evidence suggesting that, for the USPTO, geographic origin of the applicant matters, 
e.g. US examiners add more citations to foreign applications (Alcácer et al., 2009). However, 
there is a lack of research on a similar ‘club effect’ in the case of the European Patent Office 
(EPO). This is unfortunate because the EPO is frequently used as a benchmark against the 
USPTO, and is considered one of the highest quality patent systems due to its rigorous 
granting process and flexibility applied to later stages in a patent’s life (Saint-George & van 
Pottelsberghe, 2013). This paper focuses on the EPO. By comparing with the USPTO, we 
should be able to identify whether there is a symmetrical geographical effect, namely whether 
EPO patent examiners are more likely to add citations to foreign applications: Do EPO 
examiners add extra citations to applications from countries outside the European Patent 
Organization (EPOrg)? And do EPO examiners add extra citations to applications from 
countries other than their own? 
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Model, data and variables 
We estimate the following model: 
 Pr( ) ( , , , )ijklt it jt kt lt ijkltappcit f X X X X       (1) 
where appcit is equal to 1 if the citation is inserted by the applicant and 0 if inserted by the 
examiner. The probability varies according to the characteristics of the citation i, the patent j, 
the applicant k and the applicant country l. The year of the patent application t, is lagged two 
periods for national economic and research and development (R&D) characteristics to prevent 
endogeneity. 
Data on patents and citations come from Patstat (October 2012 edition). We selected patents 
where the publication authority was the EPO –almost 2.5 million. After removing those with 
missing or unreliable information for application year and technology class (represented by 
the International Patent Classification IPC), and those without citations, we were left with 2 
million patents. 
Those patents contained over 12 million citations. Patstat classifies them into origin types, i.e. 
the moment in the examination process when the citation was inserted. There are ten types of 
origins (coded 0-9), but only some are relevant for this study, i.e. those indicating that either 
patent applicant or examiner could have inserted the citation (see section ¡Error! No se 
encuentra el origen de la referencia. for further details): origins coded 0 (citations 
introduced during search), 2 (citations introduced during examination) and 5 (citations from 
the International Search Report). They represent most (82%) of the citations. 
Patstat differentiates who inserted the citation by classifying citations with origins 0, 2 and 5 
into several categories. Categories (coded with single letters, A, X, Y, etc.), refer to the 
relevance of prior art to invalidate claims of novelty. Criscuolo & Verspagen (2008) call 
category D ‘applicant citations’ and sum the other categories as ‘examiner citations’. We 
follow this method. 
In the estimations, the number of observations is not the number of citations for two reasons. 
First, duplicates are created if the patent has more than one applicant. We deal with this 
econometrically by weighting the observations by the inverse number of applicants. Second, 
we match Patstat to other databases on national characteristics that do not have full 
information for all countries and years. The sample includes over 3.6 million observations. 
The proportion of D-citations in the total is our dependent variable, computable for over 7 
million citations. 
Table 1 provides information on the econometric model variables.  
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the citation comes from the 
examiner. A logit model is appropriate for this kind of data. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (n=3,663,276) 
 
* Methodology for construction of ECOOM data explained in DuPlessis et al. (2009), Magerman et al. 
(2009) and Peeters et al. (2009). 
Vector Name Source Variables Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
appcitijklt Applicant 
citation 
Patstat Citation 
category D 
1 if citation category is 
D, 0 if other category 
0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Xit Citation 
characteristics 
Patstat Non-patent 
literature 
1 if non-patent 
literature, 0 if patent 
literature 
0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
European 
search report 
1 if origin in search 
report 
0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Examination 
report 
1 if origin in 
examination 
0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Xjt Patent 
characteristics 
Patstat Euro-PCT 1 if EPO-PCT, 0 if 
direct EPO 
0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Grant 1 if granted, 0 
otherwise 
0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Filing year Application year 2001.94 3.03 1997.00 2007.00 
 
A Human 
Necessities 
1 if IPC code is 
A Human Necessities 
0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
B Performing 
Operations; 
Transporting 
B Performing 
Operations; 
Transporting 
0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
C Chemistry; 
Metallurgy 
C Chemistry; 
Metallurgy 
0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
D Textiles; 
Paper 
D Textiles; Paper 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
E Fixed 
Constructions 
E Fixed Constructions 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
F Mechanical 
Engineering; 
Lighting; 
Heating; 
Weapons; 
Blasting 
F Mechanical 
Engineering; Lighting; 
Heating; Weapons; 
Blasting 
0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
G Physics G Physics 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
H Electricity H Electricity 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Xkt Applicant 
characteristics 
ECOOM*  
Individual 
1 if institutional sector 
is… 
Individual only 
0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Government Government only 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
University University only 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Hospital Hospital only 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Company-
government 
Company and 
government 
0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Company-
university 
Company and 
university 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Company-
hospital 
Company and hospital 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Government-
university 
Government and 
university 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
# applications 
Number of applications 
(millions) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
Xlt Country of 
applicant 
characteristics 
– economic 
and R&D 
OECD 
R&D 
Statistics 
GDP Real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP): billion 
Euro 
0.04 0.04 0.00 0.13 
GDP per capita GDP: Euro per 
inhabitant (millions) 
0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07 
GERD intensity Total intramural Gross 
R&D expenditure 
(GERD): Millions of 
Purchasing Power 
Standards (PPS) at 
2000 prices 
2.51 0.47 0.28 4.58 
% business 
funding of 
R&D 
Business R&D 
funding: Share of 
GERD 
0.64 0.09 0.17 0.91 
Country of 
applicant 
characteristics 
– related to 
EPO 
EPO 
Annual 
Reports 
Prob EPO exam 
same country 
Probability of 
examiner from same 
nationality 
0.10 0.10 0.00 0.26 
EPOrg member 
EPO member (yes/no) 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
4 
Results 
0 presents the estimations. Column 1 includes the specification of Equation 1 with 
citation and patent characteristics only; the remaining columns include the variables 
progressively. 
Citation and patent characteristics 
The results for the sub-national variables are consistent across estimations. Citations are 
coded to indicate whether the origin is a Euro-PCT (not a direct EPO) application, and 
whether it is the European search report or the examiner report (rather than the 
international search report). The coefficient of “Euro-PCT” is negative and significant, 
indicating that this longer procedure leads to higher numbers of examiner citations. The 
coefficient of “European search report” is negative and significant, implying that 
citations in this second phase are more likely to be associated with examiners than if 
there was an international search report in the first phase. The coefficient of “Examiner 
report” is also negative and significant and higher than the coefficient of “European 
search report”, meaning that citations in this third phase are most likely to come from 
examiners. 
The sample includes applications and grants. This is controlled for in the models by the 
dummy variable “Grant”. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant. Hence, 
we can confirm a link between receiving relatively fewer examiner citations and having 
the patent granted. In part, this is intuitive. It becomes more interesting if we consider 
that, in the USPTO, this does not necessarily apply. In the USPTO, more experienced 
examiners, and examiners that systematically cite less prior art, are more likely to award 
patent grants (Lemley & Sampat, 2012). Moreover, USPTO examiners rarely use 
applicant citations to reject a grant (Cotropia et al., 2013). Hence, examiner citation 
shares are not associated with denial of a grant in the USPTO but they are in the EPO. 
This and other signs may indicate the superiority of the EPO patent system (Saint-
George & van Pottelsberghe, 2013). 
We test whether applicants are more likely than examiners to cite non-patent literature, 
extrapolating from US evidence that examiners rarely cite non-patent literature (Sampat, 
2004). The positive and significant sign of “Non-patent literature” shows that this is the 
case. Applicants are probably more familiar with the fundamental knowledge base 
underpinning their inventions, while examiners are often engineers whose expertise is 
related more to parcels of applied knowledge. 
Applicant characteristics 
Dummies for organizational type of the applicant (models 2-3) can be used to validate 
empirically which one matters more. “Company only” is the benchmark. The positive, 
significant coefficients of “Government only” and “University only” indicate that these 
institutions generate more reliability than corporate patents. The coefficients of 
“Individuals only” and “Hospital only” are negative and significant, which means that 
citations are less likely to originate in applicants than in the case of firms. Individuals 
may show lower citation shares because institutions facilitate settings where citing is 
more common practice, i.e. through sharing of references and codified knowledge. 
Examiner citation shares may be larger for hospitals because they do not have a 
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tradition of patenting, and on patents related to clinical practice which are less related to 
science.  
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Table 2. Logistic regression of the probability of an applicant originating a citation 
rather than the examiner 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. No collinearity according to 
Variance Inflation Factors. All models include a trend and eight IPC section dummies. Weight: share of 
number of applicant countries. 
 1 
Citation and patent 
characteristics 
2 
+ Applicant 
characteristics 
3 
+ Country 
characteristics 
Euro-PCT -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.48***   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
European search report -0.93*** -0.94*** -0.57***   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Examination report -2.73*** -2.74*** -2.43***   
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)    
Grant 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29***   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Non-patent literature 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.10***   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Individual  -0.15*** -0.21***   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
University  0.04*** 0.08***   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
Government  0.13*** 0.05***   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
Hospital  -0.39*** -0.31***   
  (0.07) (0.07)    
Company-government  -0.09* -0.10*    
  (0.05) (0.05)    
Company-university  1.16*** 1.14***   
  (0.29) (0.30)    
Company-hospital  0.48* 0.31     
  (0.27) (0.27)    
Government-university  -0.17 -0.40    
  (0.52) (0.53)    
# applications  -0.91 -10.64***  
  (0.56) (0.57)    
GDP   0.84***   
   (0.14)    
Per capita GDP   18.77***   
   (0.86)    
GERD intensity   0.27***   
   (0.01)    
% business funding of R&D   -0.88***   
   (0.04)    
Prob EPO exam same country   0.61***   
   (0.04)    
EPOrg member   0.64***   
   (0.01)    
Constant 37.53*** 38.74*** 67.19***   
 (1.44) (1.45) (1.64)    
Observations 3,663,276 3,663,276 3,663,276  
Log likelihood -848,023 -847,774 -838,745   
χ2 54,181 54,658 75,414    
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000    
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Models 2-3 include dummies for types of organizational interactions (taking “Company 
only” as benchmark). University-company co-applications for patents are strongly 
associated with a higher probability of an applicant rather than the examiner including a 
citation. Somewhat surprisingly, government-company co-application for patents is 
negatively related to that probability. A possible reason might be that organizations in 
the category government have heterogeneous missions. Government labs with an 
industry orientation are more likely to engage in partnerships with firms that lead to 
patents, than labs with an academic orientation, and the government-company dummy 
captures this type of partnership. This double industry orientation receives a higher 
share of examiner citations. For other interactions (“Company-hospital”, “University-
government”) the dependent variable does not change significantly. 
The number of applicant citations decreases with the increase in the number of 
applications. Alcácer et al. (2009) found the same in the USPTO case. Their explanation 
is that large applicants prefer “broad patent portfolios, with relatively low value placed 
on any single invention” (p. 426). Alternatively, it might be that applicants include 
unrelated cites after the invention or omit relevant cites for strategic reasons (Breschi & 
Lissoni, 2005). Perhaps experienced applicants learn how to “cheat”, and hide a higher 
number of relevant references. 
National characteristics 
The variables GDP, per capita GDP and GERD intensity test the assumption that larger, 
wealthier and scientifically stronger countries are more likely to create conditions 
favorable to the appearance of novelty. Their positive, significant coefficients provide 
evidence to support it. Hence, we observe that countries with these favorable 
endowments benefit from lower examiner citation shares. 
The coefficient of the share of business funding variable in model 3 is negative and 
significant, supporting this expectation. Examiner citation shares are higher in patents 
from national contexts where the research orientation is towards more applied research. 
Country block effects may also play a role in the model. Specifically, we are interested 
in whether there is a club effect similar to the one shown by Alcácer et al. (2009) in the 
USPTO case: US applicants receive fewer examiner citation shares than non-US ones. 
In our EPO sample, this club effect would not be strictly national since the EPO is 
international. Instead, we propose that such an effect might be visible for countries 
belonging to the EPOrg. In the model, the dummy is equal to 1 if the applicant country 
belongs to EPOrg, to capture this phenomenon. The estimation (positive and significant) 
verifies that there is a lower propensity for EPOrg member states to receive cites from 
the examiner. Hence, the EPO is similar to the USPTO: outsiders are less warmly 
received. 
Having isolated a club effect, the nationality of examiners might be influential. Collins 
& Wyatt (1988) detected national chauvinism in citations to non-patent literature in US 
genetics patents: “it appears that every country is its own best citer” (p.73). However, 
Meyer (2000) finds no signs of national chauvinism in nanotechnology patent 
applications to the USPTO from Swedish applicants. In our estimation, the positive, 
significant coefficient of the probability of an application being examined by an 
examiner from the same country as the patent applicant provides support for the 
national bias assumption. 
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Conclusions 
The literature on the geography of knowledge flows has shown that the probability of an 
applicant rather than the examiner originating a citation depends on differences between 
citing and cited countries. Our contribution to this stream of literature is that the 
conditions of the citing country also matter to predict that probability. Our findings 
show that better national economic and scientific endowments increase applicant 
citation shares, whereas higher proportions of business funding of R&D foster examiner 
citation shares. Future research could test which group of determinants (citing country 
characteristics or citing-cited country differences) matter more. 
Previous analyses of the characteristics of applicant versus examiner citation shares 
found differences across patent and applicant. We show the presence of additional 
disparities across citation characteristics, namely procedural aspects of the patenting 
process and knowledge base of the patent. Our results for procedural aspects increase 
our understanding of the generation of citations in the various phases of the life of an 
EPO application. Our results for knowledge base suggest the importance of science to 
provide credibility to applications. 
The use of a sample based on EPO applications allowed comparison with earlier works 
exploiting USPTO evidence. It suggests that large applicant citation shares are more 
clearly associated with being awarded a patent by the EPO than the USPTO. It also 
signals that there are similar club effects, which favor EPOrg members at the EPO and 
US residents at the USPTO. Since the methods used by Alcácer et al. (2009) and those 
applied in this study differ, interpretation of this comparison should be cautious. A 
possible avenue of further inquiry could be designing an experiment to enable direct 
comparison between both data sources. 
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